One of the most common criticisms of Gen. Braxton Bragg on the
Army of Tennessee defense of Missionary Ridge is that he ordered, or at least
allowed to be ordered, the placement of the rifle pits, or trenches, along the actual crest of the ridge rather than
the military crest, which would be on
the side facing the enemy but just below the edge of the actual crest. That particular criticism of Bragg is an
unfair and inaccurate anachronism. Two
other known placements of rifle pits by commanders recognized for their
tactical skill demonstrate that this placement of rifle-pits was the standard
practice of the time.
After the troops of Maj. Gen. Sherman’s command, mostly his
own 15th Corps of the Army of the Tennessee, dug in the afternoon of 24 November
1863 on Billy Goat Hill,
they did so along the actual crest. You can still see the remains of these rifle
pits along the crest of the ridge above Battery Heights, along with several
well-preserved gun emplacements created at the same time.
When the troops of Cleburne’s Division of the Army of
Tennessee dug in at first on Trueblood/Tunnel Hill at the north end of
Missionary Ridge across Ford’s Gap from Sherman’s troops, they likewise
did so along the actual as opposed to
what’s now called the military
crest.
The reason for the later repositioning of Cleburne’s
defences had more to do with the fact that his opponent came from the north
instead of the west, necessitating the single brigade of his division in active
combat (Smith’s) dig in perpendicular to the original trench in tighter
formation just below the apex of the hill at Sherman’s Reservation where the
cannons and plaques are now.
Recognized by anyone who knows very much about the Civil War
as the best division commander of both armies, had placement of trenches along
the actual crest not been standard military doctrine at the time, Maj. Gen. Patrick
Ronayne Cleburne would not have employed it.
The remains of those initial rifles pits along the crest of Tunnel Hill
are clearly visible at Sherman’s Reservation and better preserved than those at
Billy Goat Hill.
The most-often cited as the best division commander of the
Union army, by the way, is Maj. Gen. Philip Sheridan, then of the Army of the
Cumberland.
Notably, one of Bragg’s brigade commanders, Col. Arthur
Manigault of Anderson’s Division, dissented in the placement of the rifle pits,
only to be told by Bragg’s engineer Capt. John Green that Maj. Gen.
Breckenridge, whom Bragg had charged with the belated construction of defense
works, had ordered that they be dug along the actual crest.
Disregarding
those orders, Manigault had the rifle pits of his brigade placed along the
“military crest” and futilely tried to convince the two commanders on either
side as well. As a result, Manigault’s
line held while those of Deas and Tucker on either side collapsed, though his troops
had to withdraw to keep from being overrun.
Two days
later, Cleburne led his division holding the rear guard for the Army of
Tennessee retreating to Dalton, Georgia, from Catoosa Station a mile east of
Ringgold. Knowing he would be facing the
entire Union corps commanded by Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker, he placed his artillery
in Taylor’s Gap with some infantry support and the bulk of his command atop
Whiteoak Mountain on either side. There,
the men dug in at the military rather than actual crest of the ridge and held
their positions, inflicting heavy casualties against the attacking forces.
It was, in
fact, about the time of the Battles of Tunnel Hill, Tn., of Missionary Ridge, and
of Ringgold Gap that the doctrine of a “military crest” came into being. I posit that this change in military doctrine
came about specifically because of the
experience of the quick collapse of the Army of Tennessee’s line before the
onslaught of the Army of the Cumberland on that day (25 November 1863) due in
large part to the blind spots created by the traditional placement, followed by the proven success of their alternate placement two days later on Whiteoak Ridge at Ringgold Gap.
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